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Nie, dziękuję Przekieruj mnie tamMy computer was hacked by remote access ,how do I find the IP location of remote access location?
• The quickest way to discover the IP that remotely logged in is to inspect Windows security and Remote Desktop (RDP)-specific logs:
– Security log → Event ID 4624 (successful logon) or 4625 (failure) → field “Source Network Address”.
– Applications & Services Logs → Microsoft → Windows → TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager → Operational → Event ID 21/22 → field “Client Address”.
• Corroborate with real-time tools (netstat -ano, Resource Monitor, Sysinternals TCPView) and router/firewall logs.
• Feed the suspect IP(s) to a public geolocation database (IPinfo, MaxMind, iplocation.io) to obtain an approximate city/ISP. Accuracy is limited because attackers usually hide behind VPNs, proxies, TOR, or other compromised hosts.
Understanding where the IP is recorded
a. Windows logs every authentication event. Remote-interactive RDP sessions are “Logon Type 10”, SMB or network share access is “Logon Type 3”.
b. RDP adds its own layer of logging (TerminalServices / RemoteDesktopServices).
c. Firewalls and routers commonly keep connection tables that include source-IP, destination-IP, port, timestamp.
Step-by-step forensic workflow
2.1 Isolate & preserve
• Disconnect the PC from the network, but if it is still running do not power-cycle (volatile RAM evidence).
• Image or at least copy %SystemRoot%\System32\winevt\Logs\ to external media.
• Export a list of active connections:
netstat -anob > C:\Temp\netstat_capture.txt• Create a memory snapshot if you have forensic tools (e.g., Belkasoft RAM capturer, Magnet Forensics, FTK Imager).
2.2 Extract suspect IP addresses
• Event Viewer → filter Windows Logs\Security on Event ID 4624, 4625, 4648; inspect “Logon Type” and “Source Network Address”.
• For RDP, also check:
Applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\TerminalServices-\LocalSessionManager\Operational (ID 21 = logon success, 22 = post-authentication).
• For VPN-based intrusions look at C:\Windows\System32\LogFiles\ (RRAS, PPTP, etc.).
• Router/firewall: search for inbound connections accepted/forwarded to the internal IP of your host (TCP 3389 for RDP, 5900 for VNC, 5938 for TeamViewer, 7070/7071 for AnyDesk, etc.).
2.3 Validate & contextualise
• Cross-reference connection time stamps with user activity, scheduled tasks, and USB insert events (Event ID 2003/2006).
• Map PIDs returned by netstat -o to processes in Task Manager → Details to spot unknown remote-access software.
• Compute SHA-256 hashes of suspect binaries; scan with VirusTotal or your EDR solution.
Interpreting geolocation results
• IP → ASN (Autonomous System) lookup reveals ISP / hosting provider.
• GeoIP gives only approximate city-level accuracy; cellular ranges may show a different town, VPNs/proxies may show a different country altogether.
• A single IP seldom proves the attacker’s identity; it does establish the last hop which is valuable for law-enforcement subpoenas, ISP abuse desks, or blacklist contributions.
Limitations & evasions
• NAT devices log only public-IP, not the internal source; ensure logging is enabled on the gateway.
• Attackers often pivot through several victims, or spin up short-lived cloud instances.
• With TOR or privacy-enhanced VPNs, source attribution typically requires law-enforcement cooperation or is infeasible.
• Windows 11 23H2 introduced Tamper-Protected logs and “Failed/Successful RDP connection” audit categories—enable them via Settings → Privacy & Security → Windows Security → Open Windows Security → Device Security → Core Isolation.
• Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR) solutions such as Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne automatically tag the remote IP, geolocate, and correlate with known malicious infrastructure.
• Cloud-based log aggregation (SIEM/SOAR) like Azure Sentinel or Splunk Cloud makes long-term retention and cross-host correlation easier—important because attackers often dwell for weeks before discovery (M-Trends 2024 median dwell time ≈ 16 days).
• IPv6 adoption is ~45 % of global traffic; check both IPv4 and IPv6 logs.
Logon Type cheat-sheet:
• 2 – Interactive (keyboard/console)
• 3 – Network (SMB shares, etc.)
• 4 – Batch (scheduled tasks)
• 5 – Service (service account)
• 7 – Unlock workstation
• 10 – RemoteInteractive (RDP / ICA)
• 11 – CachedInteractive (cached creds)
Example Event 4624 snippet:
Log Name: Security
Event ID: 4624
Logon Type: 10
Account Name: Administrator
Source Network Address: 185.234.217.17
Source Port: 53104Geolocation quick PowerShell one-liner:
(Invoke-RestMethod "https://ipinfo.io/185.234.217.17/json").loc• Accessing logs on your own systems is legal; probing remote hosts without permission is not.
• Retain evidence in original form; courts typically require a documented chain-of-custody.
• If personal or financial data was exposed, many jurisdictions (GDPR, CCPA, HIPAA, etc.) impose breach-notification obligations.
• Do not retaliate (hack-back) — prohibited by laws such as the U.S. CFAA.
Harden the host
• Disable RDP if unused; otherwise enforce NLA, strong passwords, and two-factor authentication (e.g., Duo, Windows Hello for Business).
• Restrict access with firewall rules or a VPN gateway (WireGuard/IPsec) instead of direct port 3389 exposure.
• Keep OS and firmware patched; enable memory integrity & Smart App Control on Windows 11.
Harden the network
• Disable UPnP; review port-forwarding rules monthly.
• Segment IoT and guest devices on a separate VLAN/Wi-Fi SSID.
• Deploy an IDS/IPS (Zeek / Suricata) or at least router-level threat feeds (pfBlocker, OPNsense ET rules).
Continuous monitoring
• Enable Windows Defender Firewall logging (wf.msc → Properties → Logging → Size 32 MB, log dropped & allowed packets).
• Centralise logs with WEF (Windows Event Forwarding) or open-source solutions (Graylog, ELK).
• If the compromise involved a kernel-level rootkit, the safest remediation is “nuke-and-pave”: full drive wipe and clean OS install.
• Some malware cleans its own logs; absence of evidence ≠ evidence of absence.
• Consumer-grade routers often have limited log retention; export them regularly.
• Study SANS FOR500 (Windows Forensics) free poster for an expanded list of Event IDs.
• Experiment with open-source DFIR suites (Velociraptor, Kape, Autopsy).
• Explore Microsoft’s free Sysinternals tools (Sysmon, ProcMon) to gain deeper process/network visibility.
• Follow MITRE ATT&CK updates (techniques T1021.001 – RDP, T1071 – Application Layer Protocol).
Locate the attacker’s IP by mining Security (ID 4624/4625) and RDP logs (ID 21/22), confirm with real-time connection tools (netstat, TCPView), and cross-check router/firewall records. Feed any suspect IP to reputable GeoIP services, but remember geolocation is approximate—VPNs, proxies, or TOR frequently mask the true origin. Preserve evidence, involve professionals if sensitive data is at risk, fully re-image compromised systems, and harden both host and network to prevent recurrence.