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OpenBeken BK7231 OTA: Adding Custom Key to .rbl Firmware File for Secure Updates

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User question

How to add custom ota key to OpenBK7231 OTA RBL file ?

Artificial Intelligence Response

Direct answer to the question

  • In stock OpenBeken (OpenBK7231), there is no supported “custom OTA key” field you can add to an .rbl and have the firmware enforce it. OpenBeken accepts any correctly‑formed Beken .rbl for the right chipset and validates it by header/CRC; the browser UI used to do only superficial filename checks. If you need key‑based authenticity, you must fork OpenBeken and add your own signing/encryption on both the packer side and in the device’s OTA handler, then install that modified firmware once over UART. (docs.libretiny.eu)
  • Practical implication: you can’t “just put a key” into an .rbl and have stock OpenBeken verify it. You must implement and deploy a matching verification scheme.

Key points

  • .rbl is the standard Beken OTA container used by OBK; the web UI drag‑and‑drop (and the /api/ota endpoint) accept a valid .rbl for BK7231T/N. (docs.libretiny.eu)
  • Official firmware does not enforce a secret key/signature; earlier “rejections” were client‑side checks in the web wrapper (not in the device). (reddit.com)
  • The .rbl file is generated by the Beken packager; you can also reconstruct .rbls with bk7231tools, which shows the format is a container with header and CRC. (elektroda.com)

Detailed problem analysis

  • What .rbl is: For BK7231, OTA payloads are wrapped by a Beken packager into an .rbl container that carries header fields (magic, lengths, CRCs, version, etc.) and the payload. OpenBeken uses that standard Beken OTA container. (elektroda.com)
  • What OBK actually checks: Current OpenBeken builds accept a valid .rbl for the target (BK7231T vs BK7231N) and rely on header/CRC to decide if the file is well‑formed, not on a cryptographic key. Any “invalid file selected” messages many users saw were transient checks in the open‑source web wrapper (chipset/file‑name guards), not cryptographic enforcement in the firmware. The device can even be updated by POSTing the .rbl directly to /api/ota, bypassing the UI check. (reddit.com)
  • Why you can’t “add a key” into the .rbl: The stock boot/OTA path in OBK does not parse or enforce a user‑defined secret in the .rbl header; even if you stuffed bytes into unused header fields, the firmware would ignore them. To require a key, the validation logic must be added in firmware (before accepting the update) and a matching packer must produce an authenticated/encrypted artifact.
  • Two viable security models if you need a “custom key”: 1) Signature only (recommended): Append or embed an HMAC‑SHA256 (or ECDSA) signature over the .rbl header+payload. Device verifies signature using a product key stored in code/flash before it proceeds to write/activate the update. No changes to the ciphertext/CRC ordering are needed; you just add a TLV or a trailer and check it before flashing. 2) Encryption + optional signature: Encrypt the payload (e.g., AES‑CTR/CBC with IV in header) in your packer and decrypt in the device before writing or at install time. If you encrypt, you should still add a signature or at least an HMAC to prevent malleability; and you must be consistent with CRC calculation order (usually CRC over ciphertext if you keep the stock header CRC semantics).
  • One‑time deployment requirement: Because stock OBK doesn’t know your key, your first secure build (with key verification code) must be installed by UART/SPI. All further updates can be OTA using your signed/encrypted .rbls.

Current information and trends

  • As of mid‑January 2026 (latest tag 1.18.247 dated Jan 15, 2026), OpenBeken still distributes OTA images as .rbl and documents drag‑and‑drop OTA for BK7231. There is no announcement of a built‑in signature/key gate for .rbl acceptance. (github.com)
  • The LibreTiny docs and multiple community threads consistently describe OBK OTA as “standard Beken .rbl,” with web‑side filename checks that have been relaxed/removed; direct POST to /api/ota remains possible. (docs.libretiny.eu)
  • Tools like bk7231tools can reconstruct/emit .rbls, reinforcing that the format is a generic Beken container rather than an OBK‑specific, key‑bound artifact. (github.com)

Supporting explanations and details

Technical outline to add your own OTA key enforcement (signature model)

  • Where to hook in firmware:
    • HTTP OTA endpoint handler (the code that processes /api/ota uploads) – add a step that computes HMAC/ECDSA verification on the uploaded buffer before writing to the OTA slot. If verification fails, abort. The web wrapper remains unchanged.
    • Boot‑time swap/activation logic (if present) usually only checks CRC; leave it as is because you will have rejected bad images earlier.
  • Artifact format (robust, backward‑compatible):
    • Keep the standard .rbl header and payload exactly as the Beken packager generates (so CRCs remain valid).
    • Add a small signed “descriptor” TLV after the .rbl payload or place a signature blob in an agreed, unused header extension area your firmware understands.
    • Fields to include in the signature input: .rbl header (sans CRC field if you prefer), ciphertext/plaintext payload (be consistent), firmware version, and chipset tag. This prevents cross‑chip flashing and downgrade attacks.
  • Key handling:
    • Use a per‑product HMAC key compiled into your secure build, or store it in a reserved flash page protected by your update flow. Never ship the key in scripts or public repos.
  • Minimal packer change:
    • Post‑process the stock .rbl (produced by the Beken packager) with a small Python tool that computes HMAC‑SHA256 over the chosen input and appends a TLV like:
    • type=0xF0 (“SIG”), length=32, value=HMAC. On device, locate 0xF0 TLV and verify.

Alternative encryption model

  • Encrypt the payload with AES‑CTR/CBC using a per‑product key; store the IV in a custom TLV (type 0xF1). Compute CRC over ciphertext so the stock header remains consistent, and compute an HMAC over header+ciphertext. Device verifies HMAC first, then decrypts and programs. This provides confidentiality and integrity but requires a bit more work and careful buffer handling.

Ethical and legal aspects

  • Keep private keys confidential; treat them as secrets equivalent to production credentials.
  • Ensure that deploying a custom, locked‑down boot/update path does not violate local right‑to‑repair or warranty laws if you ship devices to customers.
  • Document recovery options for end users; provide a UART unlock path in case OTA is bricked.

Practical guidelines

Implementation steps (signature model, recommended) 1) Build and flash once by UART a fork of OBK with:

  • A small HMAC library (or use platform crypto).
  • Added verification in the OTA upload path; abort if signature invalid.
  • A compile‑time or flash‑stored per‑product HMAC key. 2) Modify your CI to:
  • Build normal OBK .bin.
  • Run the Beken packager to produce the standard .rbl.
  • Run your “sign_rbl.py” to append the SIG TLV using your private key. 3) Distribution and update:
  • Host only signed .rbls. Users can update via the web app drag‑and‑drop or via POST /api/ota; unsigned or tampered .rbls will be rejected by your firmware. (reddit.com) 4) Testing:
  • Try a negative test: strip or corrupt the signature; confirm OTA rejects the file before any flash write.
  • Check that version/downgrade rules are enforced in your verification code if you include version in the signed data.

Pitfalls to avoid

  • Don’t change the way the standard header CRC is computed unless you also change device‑side parsing. A safe path is to leave the header and payload as produced by the packager and only add a trailer/TLV your firmware knows about. (elektroda.com)
  • If you choose encryption, be explicit about padding/mode and the order of operations (Encrypt, then CRC and sign). Mismatched ordering causes install failures.

Possible disclaimers or additional notes

  • Some vendor firmwares on BK7231 families use their own AES “coeff/key” schemes, but that is unrelated to OpenBeken’s acceptance of .rbl. You are implementing your own scheme if you need keys. (elektroda.com)
  • Community guides that mention “web panel checks” refer to client‑side filename/chipset guards in the web app, not to cryptographic validations in the device. Those guards can be bypassed by posting to /api/ota, which is why adding a real signature in firmware is the only robust solution. (reddit.com)

Suggestions for further research

  • Study the .rbl generation flow in your build logs and scripts (“beken packager … generate ota file … .rbl”) to understand where to integrate the signing step. (elektroda.com)
  • Review bk7231tools’ handling of .rbl to see practical examples of header semantics and CRCs; it can reconstruct .rbls from dumps. (github.com)
  • If you need cross‑ecosystem OTA migration (e.g., LibreTiny/ESPHome <-> OBK), consult the LibreTiny “OTA openbeken” notes for format and naming expectations. (docs.libretiny.eu)

Brief summary

  • Stock OpenBeken does not support embedding/enforcing a “custom OTA key” in .rbl. The firmware validates .rbl structure/CRC, not a secret. To add key‑based security, fork OBK, add signature (or encryption+signature) verification in the OTA handler, and sign your .rbls in CI; deploy that modified firmware once by UART, then use secure OTA thereafter. This is the only reliable way to make a “custom OTA key” meaningful in the OpenBK7231 OTA process. (docs.libretiny.eu)

If you want, I can sketch a concrete sign_rbl.py and the minimal device‑side verification stub next, and point you to the places in the OBK source tree to insert them.

User question

How to extract OTA keys from stock firmware bk7231n ?

Artificial Intelligence Response

Direct answer to the question

  • “OTA keys” on BK7231N usually means one of three things. Extracting each requires a different path: 1) Flash-encryption key (4×32‑bit) the bootloader uses to store code partitions. Read it from eFuse with ltchiptool; if blocked, use the “bootloader-dump-to-OTA” method to have the bootloader reveal it over UART. Default on many Tuya/Beken devices is 510fb093 a3cbeadc 5993a17e c7adeb03, but many ODMs ship non‑default keys. (docs.libretiny.eu) 2) OTA package AES key (used by some stock OTA updaters to encrypt the OTA payload before the bootloader re‑encrypts to flash). Often 0123456789ABCDEF, sometimes device/vendor‑specific, and some bootloaders accept unencrypted OTA. You recover/validate it by attempting known/common keys or by analyzing the dump; there is no single universal value. (docs.libretiny.eu) 3) Tuya device credentials used by Tuya OTA and cloud (uuid, auzKey/local_key). Dump flash and parse the Tuya Storage/KVS area with bk7231tools to extract them. (github.com)

Key steps:

  • Make a full 2 MiB flash backup first (ltchiptool GUI/CLI or BK7231 GUI Flash Tool). (docs.libretiny.eu)
  • If you need the 4×32‑bit flash key: try ltchiptool “Get chip info” (reads eFuse). If eFuse is unreadable/zeroed, flash the bk72xx‑bootloader‑dump image into the OTA partition and capture UART logs on reboot; the bootloader will process it and you can derive the key. (docs.libretiny.eu)
  • If you need Tuya credentials: dissect the dump with bk7231tools; it can extract Tuya Storage/KVS automatically. (github.com)

Detailed problem analysis

  • Terminology clarified

    • Flash‑encryption key (aka “flash key”, 128‑bit as 4×32‑bit): compiled into third‑party builds (LibreTiny/ESPHome/OpenBK) to match the device. If wrong, the firmware won’t boot. Many Tuya/Beken devices use the same default, but a growing number now ship custom keys. (docs.libretiny.eu)
    • OTA AES key: symmetric key some vendor OTA flows use to encrypt the .bin/.rbl payload delivered to the bootloader. The bootloader then re‑encrypts to flash using the flash key. Some bootloaders allow unencrypted OTA. There is no standardized per‑chip place to read the OTA AES key; you infer or brute‑test common values. (docs.libretiny.eu)
    • Tuya credentials (uuid, auzKey, local_key): live in user/config partitions (KVS/Tuya Storage). They are not the same as the flash/OTA keys, but are relevant if you intend to interact with Tuya cloud/OTA. (github.com)

  • Why the “bootloader‑dump” method works

    • The BK7231 bootloader maintains its own copy of the flash‑encryption key and encrypts OTA‑received code “on the fly” before programming it into the app partition. By placing a crafted image in the OTA slot, you force the bootloader code path that applies its internal key; the helper image/technique is designed so you can recover the 4×32‑bit key material from UART output or observable transformation. (docs.libretiny.eu)

  • Flash layout context

    • Typical 2 MiB modules (e.g., Tuya CB2L) have an App partition, an OTA partition, and a set of small config areas including “Tuya Storage”. That’s where JSON/KVS holding uuid/keys lives. Exact offsets vary by module; for CB2L, Tuya Storage is near the end of flash. (docs.libretiny.eu)

Current information and trends

  • As of January 17, 2026, LibreTiny documentation explicitly notes that non‑default flash keys are increasingly common; you should not assume the Tuya/Beken default will work. (docs.libretiny.eu)
  • Tooling has consolidated around ltchiptool (GUI/CLI) for safe read/write and BK7231GUIFlashTool for a beginner‑friendly workflow that always backs up before flashing. (docs.libretiny.eu)
  • bk7231tools continues to support automated dissection and Tuya Storage extraction (requires PyCryptodome), simplifying recovery of uuid/auzKey/local_key from dumps. (github.com)
  • tuya‑cloudcutter remains a path to convert devices OTA without soldering on many BK7231N/T devices, but it does not inherently “give you” the flash/OTA AES key; it focuses on OTA conversion. (docs.libretiny.eu)

Supporting explanations and details

  • What you can and cannot “extract”

    • Flash‑encryption key: recoverable via eFuse read (if not masked) or via the bootloader‑dump OTA trick. (docs.libretiny.eu)
    • OTA AES key: sometimes standardized to 0123456789ABCDEF; otherwise vendor‑specific. Since it’s a software constant used by the bootloader OTA code, it’s typically discovered by binary analysis or trial with common values; some devices accept plaintext OTA. (docs.libretiny.eu)
    • Tuya credentials: present as plaintext/obfuscated JSON or KVS blobs in the Tuya Storage region; bk7231tools can parse these from your dump. (github.com)

  • Why wrong keys brick the boot

    • The bootloader expects code partitions encrypted with the correct 4×32‑bit key; if your firmware was built with a different key, the bootloader can’t execute the image and the device hangs or reboots. (docs.libretiny.eu)

Ethical and legal aspects

  • In the United States, extracting keys from a device you own can implicate anti‑circumvention rules and license terms. There are narrow exemptions (e.g., device repair/security research) but these are nuanced and time‑limited; consult counsel if in doubt. Always avoid accessing third‑party services with credentials from devices you don’t own. Handle any recovered secrets responsibly.

Practical guidelines

  • Hardware setup

    • Use a 3.3 V USB‑to‑UART. Connect RX↔TX1 (P11/P10), GND↔GND. Provide a stable 3.3 V supply. (docs.libretiny.eu)

  • Full backup (recommended first step)

    • ltchiptool GUI: “Read flash” for 2 MiB dump. CLI example: ltchiptool flash read bk7231n dump.bin. (docs.libretiny.eu)
    • Alternative: BK7231 GUI Flash Tool “Backup and flash new” (also makes a full backup). (github.com)

  • Extracting the 4×32‑bit flash‑encryption key 1) Try eFuse read: in ltchiptool, run “Get chip info” (GUI) or applicable CLI to read eFuse; if not protected, you’ll see four 32‑bit words. (docs.libretiny.eu) 2) If eFuse shows 00000000 or is unreadable, use bootloader‑dump:

    • Identify the OTA partition offset from your dump (ltchiptool “file/analyze” can help). (docs.libretiny.eu)
    • Flash the bk72xx‑bootloader‑dump binary into the OTA partition.
    • Reboot and capture UART logs; derive/collect the 4×32‑bit key as printed/observable. (docs.libretiny.eu) 3) Test the key by building your firmware (LibreTiny/ESPHome/OpenBeken) with that exact key; a mismatch will fail to boot. (docs.libretiny.eu)

  • Extracting Tuya credentials (uuid, auzKey/local_key)

    • Run: bk7231tools dissect_dump -e -O out_dir dump.bin. Look in the extracted Tuya Storage/KVS artifacts for those fields. (github.com)
    • If you prefer manual triage, use the module’s memory map to locate Tuya Storage (example maps show “Tuya Storage” near the end of flash on CB2L/BK7231N) and search JSON/KVS records. (docs.libretiny.eu)

  • Figuring out the OTA AES key (if the vendor bootloader requires it)

    • Try the common 16‑byte value 0123456789ABCDEF; if that fails, attempt an unencrypted package (some bootloaders accept plaintext). If both fail, you’ll need to reverse the bootloader or diff a captured OTA to derive the key. (docs.libretiny.eu)

  • OTA conversion option (no solder)

    • If your goal is migrating to custom firmware without UART, check tuya‑cloudcutter; it supports many BK7231N/T devices, but it doesn’t expose the flash/OTA keys by itself. (docs.libretiny.eu)

Possible disclaimers or additional notes

  • Not all BK7231N devices share the same keys; assume they may differ by ODM lot. The “default” key is only a starting point. (docs.libretiny.eu)
  • Some vendor builds may obfuscate or relocate Tuya Storage. bk7231tools helps, but manual analysis with a hex editor or Ghidra can still be required. (github.com)
  • Always restore the OTA slot from your backup after the bootloader‑dump procedure to return the device to factory behavior.

Suggestions for further research

  • Reverse‑engineer the bootloader in Ghidra to locate AES routines/constants if you suspect a non‑standard OTA AES key.
  • Read LibreTiny’s OTA format and BK72xx platform notes for deeper understanding of dual‑OTA layouts and safe flashing practices. (docs.libretiny.eu)
  • Track ltchiptool and bk7231tools release notes; both evolve quickly and add device‑specific helpers. (docs.libretiny.eu)

Brief summary

  • Make a full dump first. Use ltchiptool “Get chip info” to read the 4×32‑bit flash‑encryption key from eFuse; if unavailable, use the bootloader‑dump‑to‑OTA trick to recover it. The default many devices use is 510fb093 a3cbeadc 5993a17e c7adeb03, but do not rely on it. OTA AES may be 0123456789ABCDEF or vendor‑specific; some bootloaders accept plaintext. Tuya credentials come from the Tuya Storage/KVS area; extract with bk7231tools. (docs.libretiny.eu)

If you tell me which of the three you specifically need (flash‑encryption key, OTA AES key, or Tuya credentials), I can give an exact, command‑level procedure tailored to your device and dump.

User question

How to extract OTA keys from stock firmware image of bk7231n?

Artificial Intelligence Response

Direct answer to the question

  • Short answer: you generally cannot extract the OTA keys directly from a stock BK7231N firmware image alone. The keys you care about live in eFuse (flash-encryption key, 4×32‑bit) and/or inside the bootloader (OTA AES key), not in the application image. You either read them from the device (preferred) or infer them from the bootloader; many devices use well‑known defaults. (docs.libretiny.eu)
  • Key points:
    • Flash-encryption key (4 words) is usually 510fb093 a3cbeadc 5993a17e c7adeb03 on Tuya/Beken BK7231N; non‑standard keys exist. (docs.libretiny.eu)
    • OTA packages (RBL) are typically encrypted with a separate AES key that’s often 0123456789ABCDEF, but can vary or be unencrypted. You won’t find that AES key in the app image. (docs.libretiny.eu)
    • Use ltchiptool/bk7231tools with a device‑side dump to locate bootloader and (if possible) read eFuse; from a “file-only” image you can at best analyze the bootloader to recover an OTA AES key, not the eFuse key. (pypi.org)

Detailed problem analysis

  • What “OTA key” do you mean?

    • Flash-encryption key (device key): 128‑bit value in eFuse and duplicated in the bootloader. It determines how code is stored in flash; third‑party firmware must be built with the right key to boot. This key is not derivable from the application binary. (docs.libretiny.eu)
    • OTA AES key (transport key): used by the bootloader to decrypt RBL OTA packages before re‑encrypting and writing them to the app partition. Often a simple default is used; sometimes OTA is unencrypted; sometimes a vendor‑specific key is used. This key is part of the bootloader logic, not the app. (docs.libretiny.eu)

  • Why you can’t get keys from a stock app image:

    • The app partition is encrypted at rest using the device’s flash key. The app does not contain the key; the bootloader/eFuse provide it at runtime. OTA AES handling is performed by the bootloader before the app is even executed. (docs.libretiny.eu)

  • What you can do with only a file:

    • If you have a full flash dump (2 MiB), you can dissect it to extract the bootloader and analyze it statically for a hardcoded OTA AES key. You still won’t get the eFuse flash‑encryption key from the app image. (github.com)
    • If you only have a vendor OTA RBL file, you can test common OTA AES values (e.g., 0123456789ABCDEF) and check whether the container is actually unencrypted; decryption success gives you the plaintext image but not the device’s flash key. (docs.libretiny.eu)

  • Tooling overview

    • ltchiptool (GUI/CLI): read eFuse, dump flash, identify partitions. If eFuse readout isn’t protected, “Get chip info” will show the 4×32‑bit key immediately. (pypi.org)
    • bk7231tools (CLI): dissect_dump to split a full dump into bootloader/app and auto‑extract decrypted app if possible; also reconstruct RBLs for testing. (github.com)
    • bk72xx-bootloader-dump: helper firmware you can load into the OTA slot; at boot the device’s bootloader re‑encrypts it, enabling you to derive the flash key from UART logs/behavior even when eFuse is protected. Requires knowing or guessing the OTA AES key (or using an unencrypted OTA). (github.com)

  • Ground truth about defaults and exceptions

    • Default flash key on most Tuya/Beken BK7231N/T: 510fb093 a3cbeadc 5993a17e c7adeb03. Non‑standard keys have been observed (other manufacturers, some newer units). (docs.libretiny.eu)
    • OTA AES: often 0123456789ABCDEF; some bootloaders accept unencrypted OTA; others use vendor‑specific AES and will reject your package unless you match it. (docs.libretiny.eu)

Current information and trends

  • Since 2024–2025, more devices ship with non‑default flash keys and/or eFuse readout protection, so the “just use the default” approach fails more often; plan on interacting with the device to recover keys. (docs.libretiny.eu)
  • Ecosystem tools (ltchiptool GUI v3+, bk7231tools 2.x) improved dump/dissect flows and partition recognition, making bootloader extraction and analysis easier. (pypi.org)

Supporting explanations and details

  • Data flow during OTA on BK7231N:
    • The bootloader downloads an RBL package, optionally decrypts it with the OTA AES key, validates headers/CRC, then re‑encrypts the plaintext with the device’s flash key and writes it to the app slot. Hence two distinct keys and why the app image carries neither. (docs.libretiny.eu)
  • Partition basics (typical):
    • Bootloader at 0x00000–0x10FFF; App at 0x11000…; OTA slot present for staging; exact layout varies by vendor but tools auto‑detect. (github.com)

Ethical and legal aspects

  • Only analyze firmware for devices you own or have permission to service. Extracting keys can implicate anti‑circumvention rules in some jurisdictions; in the U.S., repair/modification on owned hardware is generally permissible, but distributing vendor keys is risky. Back up and protect any user secrets found. (General guidance; not legal advice.)

Practical guidelines

  • If you have the device (recommended):

    1. Backup full flash: ltchiptool GUI or CLI; length 0x200000. (pypi.org)
    2. Try eFuse read: ltchiptool “Get chip info.” If it returns 4 words, that’s your flash key. If all zeros, eFuse is read‑protected. (docs.libretiny.eu)
    3. If protected, use bk72xx-bootloader-dump in the OTA slot; test with OTA AES = 0123456789ABCDEF or an unencrypted RBL; capture UART to derive the key. (github.com)
    4. Validate by building a minimal image with that key (LibreTiny/ESPHome/OpenBeken) and confirming boot.

  • If you only have a stock image file:

    • Full dump: run bk7231tools dissect_dump -e -O out_dir dump.bin; open the extracted bootloader in Ghidra/IDA and search for AES setup and immediate 16‑byte constants to identify an OTA AES key. You still won’t get the eFuse flash key from the file. (github.com)
    • Vendor RBL: attempt unpacking/decryption with the common OTA AES key or as unencrypted. Success yields plaintext firmware for analysis, not the device’s flash key. (docs.libretiny.eu)

  • Safety and best practices:

    • Work at 3.3 V only; never connect UART while the device is on mains. Always make a complete backup before experiments. Prefer a short, soldered UART connection during key extraction. Use verified tools (ltchiptool GUI 3.x, bk7231tools 2.x). (pypi.org)

Possible disclaimers or additional notes

  • Not all bootloaders expose or use the same OTA AES handling; a minority require vendor‑specific keys and refuse unencrypted OTA—expect trial‑and‑error. (docs.libretiny.eu)
  • App images often contain no cloud credentials; those live in dedicated storage/KVS partitions. Use bk7231tools to extract them only on devices you own. (github.com)

Suggestions for further research

  • Study LibreTiny’s “Finding encryption keys” page for the method details and caveats; read bk72xx-bootloader-dump README. (docs.libretiny.eu)
  • Learn bk7231tools dissect/rebuild flows (README); practice on known‑good dumps to recognize pattern. (github.com)
  • Keep an eye on ltchiptool releases and docs for improved partition detection and eFuse handling. (pypi.org)

Brief summary

  • From a stock BK7231N firmware image alone, you won’t extract the device’s flash key; it’s in eFuse/bootloader. Many devices use the standard 510fb093 a3cbeadc 5993a17e c7adeb03 key; others don’t. The OTA AES key that protects RBLs is typically 0123456789ABCDEF or absent (unencrypted), and it resides in the bootloader. Use ltchiptool to read eFuse or dump flash; use bk7231tools to dissect dumps and analyze the bootloader; resort to bk72xx-bootloader-dump if eFuse is protected. (docs.libretiny.eu)

If you tell me what you actually have (a full 2 MiB dump, a vendor .rbl, or only UART access) I can give you an exact command sequence for your case.

Disclaimer: The responses provided by artificial intelligence (language model) may be inaccurate and misleading. Elektroda is not responsible for the accuracy, reliability, or completeness of the presented information. All responses should be verified by the user.
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